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MOTIVATION 
Recently, social experiments have gained 
popularity as a method for evaluating social and labor 
market programs. 1 High-profile evaluations such as the 
National JTPA Study in the United States and the Self-
Sufficiency Project in Canada have brought about real 
changes in the views and the actions of policymakers. 
Most of the literature relates to these two countries in 
which there is a long-standing tradition of evaluat~g 
labor market programs. In this study, we also use data 
collected from an experiment in the United States. 
Indeed, in the United States, there is a requirement for 
public authorities to evaluate their programs. Few 
European countries have carried out rigorous 
evaluations; the Netherlands are not an exception. 
There, the most common method of "evaluation" 
consists of simply monitoring the labor market status 
and earnings of recipients for a brief period following 
their participation in the program. Although this kind 
of exercise provides useful information, it cannot 
answer the vital question as to whether the program 
fulfills its aim. 
Ideally, the evaluator would like to know what the 
outcome would have been for a program participant if 
the person had not participated; the fundamental 
difficulty is that a person is never observed in both 
states. The observable target of estimation is typically 
the average effect, defined as the average difference 
between treated (in the program) and untreated 
outcomes across all persons in a popUlation or in some 
subpopulation. In a non-experimental evaluation, 
statistical techniques are used to adjust the outcomes of 
individuals who choose not to participate in the 
program to resemble what the participants would have 
experienced had they not participated. By contrast, a 
random experiment directly produces the counterfactual 
of what would have happened to the participant had 
they not participated by forcing some potential 
participants not to participate. 
In theory, data from a randomized experiment 
produce an unbiased estimate of the effect of an 
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intervention or program on an outcome variable. A 
simple comparison of the average outcomes of the 
treatment group (consisting of those who participate in 
the program) and the control group (those who are 
excluded from participation) produces a consistent 
estimate of the impact of the program on its 
participants. In practice, a randomized experiment 
may suffer from the same problems that affect 
behavioral studies. In particular, the random 
assignment of the intervention is often compromised 
by noncompliance with the assigned intervention, i.e., 
members of the treatment sample may drop out of the 
program and members of the control group may 
participate. Noncompliance complicates the analysis 
of data from a randomized experiment in the same way 
as does nonresponse in (random) sample surveys and 
panel attrition in longitudinal studies. If the 
noncompliance is selective (i.e., is correlated with the 
outcome variable), then the difference of the average 
outcomes is a biased estimate of the average effect of 
the intervention. 
Sample selectivity is a familiar problem for 
economists, and over the years a number of approaches 
have been suggested to reduce selectivity bias. Since 
Heckman's work, the dominant approach has been to 
model the selection process.2 This is the natural 
approach if the selection process is of independent 
interest and the econometrician understands the 
process well enough to propose a reasonably accurate 
model. The first generation of these models required 
an assumption about the joint distribution of the 
responsevaIiable and the (latent) variable that 
determined participation in the program. In the second 
generation, this assumption is replaced by an elaborate 
model of the selection process under the assumption 
that an unbiased estimate of the intervention effect is 
obtained by comparing units with an (approximately) 
equal probability of participation. 
Often-and the application considered in this 
thesis is a good example-there is not enough 
information to specify a model of the selection process. 
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Moreover, the available characteristics of the 
individuals, although significantly correlated with 
compliance, do not explain compliance well enough to 
enable a comparison between members of the treatment 
and control groups in a subsample with the same 
probability of compliance. Under these circumstances 
an approach that does not require a model of the 
selection process is preferable. 
The method of instrumental variables (IV) gives an 
unbiased estimate of the intervention effect and does 
not require a model of participation. This method 
assumes that the treatment assignment results from a 
two-stage process, where in the first stage the sample is 
divided randomly in two (or more) groups, and in the 
second stage, units are free to decide whether to 
participate in the program or not. In the clinical 
literature, this experimental design is called the 
intention-to-treat (ITT) design. 
Most of the evaluation literature has focused on 
static interventions, i.e., interventions that are 
administered at a particular point in time or in a 
particular time interval. If the outcome is a waiting 
time (e.g., the time until reemployment), the 
intervention can be dynamic; that is, it can be switched 
on and off over time. Examples are the unemployment 
insurance experiments in which the unemployed 
receive a cash bonus if they find a job in a specified 
period. Another example is a temporary cut in 
unemployment benefits of unemployed individuals who 
do not expend sufficient effort to find a job. In general, 
the intervention may even depend on information that 
accumulates during the unemployment spell. With 
such a time-varying intervention, the effect of the 
intervention becomes dependent on the outcome. 
A basic quantity, fundamental in duration analysis, 
is the hazard rate. The hazard rate is, roughly speaking, 
the probability of finding a job after some time spent in 
unemployment, given that the individual was still 
unemployed at that time. It has a direct relation to the 
density of a random variable. Economic models for 
durations, e.g., search models, often have direct 
implications for the hazard rate. One advantage of a 
hazard rate model is that incorporating time-varying 
interventions is fairly easy and natural. 
Another reason to consider the effect of an 
intervention on the hazard rate is that duration data are 
usually censored. Censoring limits the observation 
period but is not a feature of the program. Hence, the 
estimated effect should be independent of the censoring 
time. Because the hazard rate is invariant to censoring, 
it is natural to relate the intervention to this quantity. 
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Two competing approaches to the estimation of the 
effect of a time-varying treatment on survival have been 
the (Mixed) Proportional Hazard ([M]PH) model and 
the Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) model. The MPH 
models have developed popularity among 
econometricians, and the AFT is commonly used by 
biostatisticians and medical statisticians. In the MPH 
model, the hazard is written as the product of the 
baseline hazard, a non-negative regression function, 
and a non-negative random variable that represents the 
covariates that are omitted from the regression 
function. There is a direct relation between hazard 
models (in particular the PH and MPH models) and 
transformation models (i.e., regression models in which 
the dependent variable is transformed). The simplest 
transformation model is the AFT model in which the 
dependent variable is the logarithm of the duration. 
If all the covariates in the model are exogenous, 
many possible procedures to estimate the parameters of 
the AFT or MPH models exist. However, if some of the 
covariates are endogenous, all these methods fail and it 
is not straightforward how to generalize the standard IV 
methods to these nonlinear duration models. This 
thesis is one of the first attempts to provide 
instrumental methods for these models with possible 
endogenous covariates. It also gives a new solution to 
well-known inference problems of the MPH models. 
The estimation methods are all based on extensions of 
the (inverse of the) log-rank statistic. 
In Chapter 2, we introduce a two-stage IV method 
for the MPH models to estimate the effect of a possible 
endogenous intervention on the hazard. This rank 
estimation method requires that the members of the 
control group are excluded from participation. The 
unobserved heterogeneity component of the MPH 
models is notoriously hard to estimate and empirically 
difficult to distinguish from the duration dependence, 
which can lead to misleading conclusions with regard 
to the regression parameters. In Chapter 3, we 
introduce the Generalized Accelerated Failure Time 
(GAFT) model, which is a generalization of both the 
AFT and the MPH models. We discuss a semi-
parametric estimation procedure of the parameters of 
this model that is independent of the shape of the 
unobserved heterogeneity. In Chapter 3 we only 
consider exogenous interventions. The analysis of 
endogenous interventions in the GAFT is dealt with in 
Chapter 4. In that chapter, we develop an IV method 
for the GAFT models. First, I give a short overview of 
the data used in the applications. 
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REEMPLOYMENT BONUS DATA AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS 
Throughout this thesis, we illustrate the use of our 
proposed models and estimators by applying them to 
data from reemployment experiments conducted 
between mid 1984 and mid 1985 by the Illinois 
Department of Employment Security.3 The experiment 
provides the opportunity to explore, within a controlled 
experimental setting, whether bonuses paid to 
unemployment insurance (UI) beneficiaries (treatment 
1) or their employers (treatment 2) reduce the 
unemployment of beneficiaries relative to a randomly 
selected control group. The first treatment was 
intended to create an incentive for UI recipients to 
search more intensively for work and to become 
employed faster. The second treatment was designed to 
provide a marginal wage subsidy that might reduce the 
duration of insured unemployment. 
Both treatments consisted of a $500 bonus 
payment, which was about four times the average 
weekly unemployment insurance benefit. In the 
experiment, newly unemployed claimants were 
randomly divided into three groups.4 
• The members of the claimant bonus group were 
instructed that they would qualify for a cash 
bonus of $500 if they found a job (of at least 30 
hours) within 11 weeks and if they held that job 
for at least four months. A total of 4,186 individ-
uals were selected for this group. Of those, 3,527 
(84 percent) agreed to participate. 
• The employer bonus group was told that their 
next employer would qualify for a cash bonus of 
$500 if they, the claimants, found a job (of at 
least 30 hours) within 11 weeks and if they held 
that job for at least four months. Of the 3,963 
selected for this group, 2,586 (65 percent) agreed 
to participate. 
• The control group (i.e., all claimants not assigned 
to one of the other groups) consisted of 3,952 
individuals. 
The individuals assigned to the control group were 
excluded from participation in the experiment. In fact, 
they did not know that the experiment took place. The 
results of the experiment indicated a reduction in the 
mean number of weeks of insured unemployment. The 
average number of insured weeks of unemployment 
decreased about one and one-half weeks for all VI 
recipients assigned to the claimant bonus group and 
about half a week for those assigned to the employer 
bonus group (both relative to the control group). 
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However, because the VI recipients are only observed 
while they receive VI benefits, for many (about 60 
percent) unemployed we only know the time they spend 
on benefits and not the time until reemployment. Thus, 
the data is heavily censored at the maximum number of 
potential weeks of VI insurance, which is 26 weeks for 
all the individuals in the experiment. 
If the bonus reduces the time spent in 
unemployment, it also reduces the probability that VI 
recipients will exhaust their VI benefits. Therefore, 
with censored data, taking averages can lead to wrong 
conclusions about the effect of the bonus on the 
duration of unemployment. In this thesis, we show that 
the logical means of accounting for this censoring 
problem is to relate the effect of the bonus to the hazard 
rate instead of to the average duration. 
Another reason to consider the hazard rate is that 
the treatment itself varies over time. Because the 
period of bonus eligibility ends after 11 weeks, we 
expect that the effect of the bonus on the reemployment 
hazard disappears after that time. It is difficult to take 
such time-varying interventions-which are common 
in duration data-into account when taking averages. 
For all three groups the reemployment hazard is high at 
the start of the unemployment spell, decreases to a 
minimum after 16 to 20 weeks in unemployment, and 
rises again close to the benefit exhaustion time of 26 
weeks. The hazards for both treatment groups are 
higher then the hazards for the control group. 
However, we cannot draw strong conclusions from 
these hazard rates due to potential selection bias. 
About 15 percent of the claimant bonus group and 35 
percent of the employer bonus group refused 
participation. The reason for this refusal is not known, 
and it is hard to think of an economic model for this 
decision. The refusal was not completely random, 
because it was significantly related to some 
characteristics of the participants, characteristics that 
are also important determinants of the reemployment 
hazard. Hence, we can not exclude the possibility that 
some unobserved variables affect both the compliance 
decision and the reemployment hazard. 
The existence of heterogeneity will bias the 
aggregate treatment effect measure. If the specification 
of the hazard rate model is incomplete, then 
randomization at the start of the spell does not ensure 
an unbiased estimate of the treatment effect, if the 
intervention affects the hazard rate multiplicatively. To 
understand this, presuppose the existence of two types 
of unemployed where one type has higher hazard rates 
than the other. The unemployed with a large hazard 
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rate leave the unemployed state quickly, and those with 
a small hazard rate typically have long unemployment 
spells. In the absence of the experiment, the sample of 
VI recipients still unemployed over time will have an 
increasing fraction of low-hazard-rate individuals. 
Therefore, the aggregate hazard would slope downward 
as more weight is placed on the low-hazard group. If 
the bonus leads to a proportional increase in the hazards 
of both types, the high-hazard types in the treatment 
group leave even faster than the high-hazard types in 
the control group, and this induces a correlation 
between the type and the intervention indicator. It is 
not difficult to see that the resulting bias in the 
intervention effect is toward zero. Note that there is no 
bias if the intervention has an additive effect on the 
hazard rate. 
Thus, we need an estimator of the effect of the 
bonus on the reemployment hazard that is consistent if 
there is selective compliance to the assigned bonus 
regime, if the data is heavily censored and, finally, if the 
treatment varies over the duration of the unemployment 
spell. Chapters 2 and 4 address the estimation of the 
effect of the bonus for two related models. We propose 
two instrumental variable methods for duration models 
that adjust for the potential endogeneity of the choice to 
be eligible for the bonus. The first method explicitly 
uses the full compliance of the control group, while the 
second method allows for the possibility that some 
members of the control group are also eligible for the 
bonus. Chapter 3 only considers the data on the control 
group and discusses the issues concerning rank 
estimation of a model that generalizes two commonly 
applied duration models, without worrying about the 
endogeneity of any covariates in the model. In Chapter 
4, we return to the whole dataset and extend the model 
of the preceding chapter to allow for selective 
compliance. 
We do not attempt to estimate the effect of bonus-
eligible individuals collecting the bonus or not. Before 
a bonus could be paid in this experiment, each member 
of the claimant and employer group had to make a 
number of decisions. Firstly, whether to agree to 
participate. Secondly, if a job was found within 11 
weeks, whether to file the Notice of Hire. Finally, 
whether to file for a bonus if the job lasted at least four 
months. This thesis only examines the effect of the 
bonus on the first unemployment spell, corrected for 
bias due to nonparticipation. 
Neither do we use the data on reemployment 
(quarterly) earnings. In principle, the wage data could 
be used to estimate a structural job search (see, e.g., 
Levine 1992; Davidson and Woodbury 1996). The 
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earnings data from the Illinois experiment seem heavily 
blurred. For many reemployed individuals, the 
(quarterly) wage in their new job is unknown 01' too low 
to be true. Therefore, we focus on the effect of the 
bonus on the duration of insured unemployment using a 
reduced form model that does not incorporate the 
reemployment earnings data. We do, on the other hand, 
use the information on the pre-unemployment earnings. 
An important limitation of the data is that we 
cannot ascertain the true labor status of a claimant 
when the VI benefits are exhausted. The administrative 
data are blind to the labor status of an individual unless 
he or she is employed in a UI-covered job or 
unemployed and receiving UI benefits. A significant 
fraction of individuals do not have reported positive 
post-UI benefit earnings. This is likely due to the same 
blindness ofthe data. In contradiction to job search 
theory, none of the earnings measures indicate a 
significant deviation of the earnings due to the bonus 
experiment. 
If the bonus and the rules for collecting it would 
become widely known, both the worker and firm 
behavior may change in several dimensions. For 
example, many people who have a short spell of 
unemployment between jobs presently do not collect 
any UI benefits. The bonus could induce some of these 
individuals to apply for and receive some VI in order to 
collect the bonus. This is a classic example of a 
deadweight effect, in which individuals receive a bonus 
for behavior they would have displayed anyway. This 
general equilibrium effect would reduce the effect in 
the society of the bonus program relative to that 
estimated by the experiment (see Meyer 1995 for a 
discussion). 
General equilibrium effects occur when the 
program affects individuals other than its participants. 
Other commonly mentioned general equilibrium effects 
are displacement effects (for example, if persons in the 
program take the job that otherwise would have been 
taken by other unemployed individuals); substitution 
effects (if the program induces the employers to 
substitute one group of workers for another group); and 
tax effects (whereby the taxes collected to finance the 
program distort the choices of both participants and 
nonparticipants). In the context of this thesis, we do 
not attempt to take these possible side effects into 
account and therefore we ignore their impact in the 
analyses. 
200 1 Dissertation Summaries 
THESIS OUTLINE 
In Chapter 2, we propose an estimator that is 
consistent for the intervention effect if there is selective 
compliance to the intervention, the outcome variable is 
a censored duration, and the intervention varies over the 
duration. The duration model is the popular mixed 
proportional hazard (MPH) model, although we need 
not impose the restriction on the disturbance 
distribution that is implicit in the MPH model. The 
estimator is a generalization of the linear rank estimator 
ofTsiatis (1990) and Robins and Tsiatis (1991). 
In particular, we allow for a nonconstant baseline 
hazard, which amounts to a transformation of the 
dependent duration in the regression representation of 
the MPH model. The estimator requires preliminary 
estimates of the baseline hazard. If there is compliance 
in the control group, then these preliminary estimates 
can be obtained from the control group sample. This is 
often the case in social experiments where the number 
of participants is a small fraction of the population and 
the members of the control group are not informed of 
the existence of the experimental program or can easily 
be excluded from participation. The preliminary 
estimates are substituted in the second-stage estimating 
equation of the intervention effect. This two-stage 
linear rank estimator is computationally attractive, 
because it avoids the choice of weighting functions for 
the estimation of the parameters of the baseline hazard. 
If the control group sample is also used in the second 
stage, the additional variability due to the preliminary 
estimates and the induced conelation between the 
preliminary estimates and the second-stage estimating 
equation complicates the computation of the 
asymptotic variance. Using the counting process 
representation of the first-stage score, we can obtain an 
estimable expression of this rather complicated 
variance. 
The estimator is applied on the data from the 
Illinois unemployment bonus experiment. Our 
estimates show that compliance in the Illinois bonus 
experiment was indeed selective. We also investigate 
whether evidence of effect heterogeneity by income 
before unemployment and by the probability of benefit 
exhaustion is biased by selective compliance. 
In Chapter 3, we consider a generalization of the 
accelerated failure time (AFT) models that includes the 
MPH models: that is, the generalized accelerated 
failure time (GAFT) model. In the GAFT model, the 
dependent variable, the time-to-event, is transformed, 
and this unknown transformation has to be estimated 
together with the regression parameters in the 
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regression function and the enor distribution. A major 
advantage of the GAFT model over the MPH model is 
that the unknown components of the GAFT model (i.e., 
the parameters of the regression function, the 
transformation, and the enor distribution) are all 
estimable with the usual precision. The only 
disadvantage of the GAFT specification is that the 
estimated parameters cannot directly be related to the 
hazard of the time-to-event. We provide an alternative 
interpretation by relating the components of the GAFT 
model to the quantiles of the duration distribution. 
We generalize the linear rank estimators that have 
been used to estimate the parameters of the AFT 
models to the GAFT models. The asymptotic 
properties of this linear rank estimator (LRE) are 
derived using counting process theory. We also address 
the semiparametric efficiency of this estimator. 
Simulation experiments indicate that the LRE performs 
well in samples of moderate size. An important side 
effect of the proposed methods in this chapter is that 
they provide a new solution to the notorious inference 
problems of the MPH models. Our semiparametric 
method leaves the distribution of the unobserved 
heterogeneity unspecified and gives consistent 
estimates of the other parameters. 
The methods in Chapter 3 are only applicable for 
exogenous covariates, and therefore we exclusively 
focus on the control group in the Illinois reemployment 
experiment. This group consisted of individuals who 
were excluded from participation in the experiment. In 
fact, we are sure they did not know that the experiment 
took place. We estimate GAFT models for this data 
using linear rank estimators. Both the simulation 
experiments and the application show that inconectly 
assuming an AFT model can lead to misleading 
conclusions about the regression coefficients. 
The GAFT model can be applied to estimate the 
effect of a randomly assigned (time-varying) treatment 
on survival. Using the actual treatment as a normal 
covariate in the model will give biased results of the 
treatment effect if some of the individuals do not 
comply with their assigned treatment. The problem is 
that even if the intervention has no effect on the hazard, 
the treatment parameter may not have a causal 
interpretation, because those who comply with their 
assigned treatment differ in observed and unobserved 
characteristics from those who do not comply. One 
could ignore the postrandomization compliance and 
rely on the analysis of the treatment assignment groups. 
This intention-to-treat estimator suffers from an enor-
in-variable bias. 
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In Chapter 4, we propose an instrumental variable 
method for GAFT models that adjusts for the possible 
endogeneity of the intervention without suffering the 
problems of the intention-to-treat method. We develop 
an estimation procedure that collapses to the linear rank 
estimator procedure for GAFT models without 
instrumenting. The GAFT models with instrumenting 
are a generalization of the rank-preserving structural 
failure time (RPSFT) models of Robins and Tsiatis 
(1991). Both models consider a transformation of the 
duration time to identify the treatment parameters, but 
the GAFT models allow for an extension of the 
transformation. The main drawback of the RPSFT 
models is that they assume a latent baseline duration 
time exists, representing the individual's survival time 
had the intervention always been withheld. This 
implies that if two individuals have identical durations 
and observed treatment and covariate histories, then 
they would have had identical durations had they never 
been treated. The GAFT models are not rank-
preserving and therefore do not imply this strong 
noninteraction. 
The two-stage linear rank (2SLR) estimator of 
Chapter 2 is related to the instrumental variable linear 
rank (IVLR) estimator proposed in Chapter 4. The 
2SLR restricts the transformation to an MPH 
representation and requires preliminary estimates of the 
baseline hazard. The 2SLR is only applicable if there is 
full compliance in the control group, because only then 
are the preliminary estimates identified. The analysis in 
Chapter 4 does not impose the MPH assumption, nor 
does it require that the control group is totally excluded 
from treatment. 
The existence of endogenous covariates implies 
(possible) dependence between the transformed 
duration and the censoring time. This implies that the 
IVLR estimator, which exploits the independence 
between the transformed durations and the instruments, 
may give biased results. If the censoring is part of the 
study design or a consequence of administrative rules, 
we can often make the assumption that the (potential) 
censoring time is known at the start of the study. Then 
we can modify the GAFT transformation such that this 
modified transformation and the instruments are 
independent, and the IVLR estimator on this modified 
transformation leads to consistent estimators. 
Again the data from the Illinois unemployment 
bonus experiment is used. In Chapter 4, we focus on 
the importance of extending the RPSFT models to the 
GAFT models for the reemployment data. Indeed, we 
find evidence that the RPSFT model is not the correct 
model for this application. Our results show that 
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restriction the transformation to an AFT model leads to 
an overestimation of the effect of the bonus. 
The Coase Theorem predicts that in a world of zero 
transaction costs, the bonuses paid to the claimant 
group and to the employer group would be equally 
efficient. Because they both imply the same amount of 
money, an employment contract would be established 
whenever the bonus was sufficient to enable a mutually 
advantageous bargain to be struck. Woodbury and 
Spiegelman (1987) concluded that only the claimant 
bonus significantly reduces unemployment. We cannot 
confirm the different treatment effects of the two 
bonuses. The selective decision to be eligible for the 
employer bonus seems to blur the effect of this 
treatment. Our results also indicate that the bonuses 
only influence the probability to find a job in the first 10 
weeks, which is in line with the bonus eligibility 
period. 
NOTES 
This thesis consists of three separate articles. Each chapter is 
solely based on those articles. Every chapter can be read 
independently of the other chapters; this implies that there is 
some overlap between the chapters. Moreover, the 
introductory sections, the sections on the application on the 
Illinois data, and the appendices with asymptotic properties 
exhibit substantial repetition among the chapters. The 
common basis of the chapters is rank estimation in duration 
models. 
This summary is from the author's doctoral dissertation at 
Free University of Amsterdam; his advisor was G. Ridder. 
Dr. Bijwaard is now at Erasmus University, Rotterdam. 
1. The chapters by Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999) 
and Angrist and Krueger (1999) in the most recent 
Handbook of Labor Economics discuss the tremendous 
flow of ideas on how to undertake evaluations of active 
labor market policies. 
2. James Heckman won the 2000 Nobel Price for economics 
for his contributions to micro econometric theory on 
selection bias and evaluation of active labor market 
programs. 
3. A complete description of the experiment and a summary 
of its results can be found in Woodbury and Spiegelman 
(1987). 
4. The eligible population for either the claimant experiment 
or the employer experiment consisted of those who filed 
an initial claim for Ul between July 29, 1984, and 
November 17, 1984, and who registered with one of the 22 
job service offices in northern and central Illinois. 
Individuals had to be eligible for 26 weeks of UI benefits, 
had to be between ages 20 and 55, and had to have no 
nonmonetary eligible claims. 
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